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Abstract
The War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718–1720) was a conflict between Spain and 
the other major European powers over the balance of power in Italy. France and 
Britain jointly intervened on the side of the attacked party, Emperor Charles VI. In 
February 1720, the conflict was resolved when Philip V of Spain finally adhered to 
the Treaty of London (2 August 1718). The decision to go to war was contentious 
at the French court. For the benefit of public opinion, Philip, duke of Orléans and 
Regent of France, had to wage war against the Spanish Prime Minister, Cardinal Giulio 
Alberoni, rather than against the Sun King’s grandson, Philip V. Moreover, whereas 
French and British diplomats found consensus as regards maintaining the principles 
of the Peace of Utrecht (11 April 1713), they remained commercial rivals. This article 
lifts a tip of the veil covering the complex trade relations during the conflict. Spain 
tried to placate and reassure French merchants, and conversely to punish their British 
counterparts. The British fleet patrolled the Mediterranean, searching French vessels 
as well as those of neutral states. The Emperor, though allied to France and Britain, 
could not prevent Neapolitan corsairs from preying on their trade. Moreover, French 
ships illegally furnished the Spanish army. Finally, France and Britain hoped to quell 
the abuse of neutral powers in the conflict (Tuscany, Genoa, Venice) by imposing 
upon them a duty to chase Spanish privateers from their harbours. The complaints of 
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French traders, as indicated by the consuls to the Conseil de la Marine and the Regent 
himself at the apex of the French government, reveal pleas borne out of frustration, as 
well as appeals to either the law of nations or consular protection to shield merchants 
from assaults and abuses. When war was declared, inimical, friendly or allied relations 
in high politics seemed almost irrelevant. The military conflict generated uncertainty 
and damaged the reputation of the French flag. Diplomatic pressure on the neutral 
powers was seen as being more effective than reliance on seemingly corrupt or biased 
local jurisdictions. The Regent’s management of the conflict - in close collaboration 
with Britain, despite all the difficulties on the ground – is all the more remarkable.
Keywords: Law of nations, legal history, commerce, War of the Quadruple Alliance, 
Regency, Italy
The Peace Treaties of Utrecht (11 April 1713), Rastatt (6 March 1714) 
and Baden (7 September 1714) were collectively a milestone in European 
diplomatic history.1 Conflicts which engulfed the whole of Europe were 
conspicuous by their absence until the Wars of the Polish Succession 
(1733–1735)2 and the Austrian Succession (1740–1748).3 The Peace of 
Utrecht ended almost a century of gruelling conflict in Europe, from the 
Thirty Years’ War to the War of the Spanish Succession.4 The partition 
of the composite Spanish monarchy between Habsburg and Bourbon 
1 Utrecht – Rastatt – Baden 1712–1714: Ein europäisches Friedenswerk am Ende des 
Zeitalters Ludwigs XIV., ed. by Heinz Duchhardt and Martin Espenhorst (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013); Lucien Bély, Espions et Ambassadeurs au Temps de 
Louis XIV (Paris: Fayard, 1990); The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An 
Historical and Critical Dictionary, ed. by Marsha Frey and Linda Frey (Westport: 
Greenwood, 1995); Rolf Stücheli, Der Friede von Baden (Schweiz) 1714 (Freiburg: 
Universitätsverlag, 1997); Heinhard Steiger, ‘Rechtliche Strukturen der europäischen 
Staatenordnung 1648–1792’, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völ-
kerrecht, 59 (1999), 609–49. 
2 John L. Sutton, The King’s Honor and the King’s Cardinal: The War of the Polish 
Succession (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980); Pierre Massuet, Histoire de 
la guerre présente contenant tout ce qui s’est passé de plus important en Italie, sur le Rhin, en 
Pologne & dans la plupart des Cours de l’Europe (Amsterdam: François l’Honoré, 1735). 
3 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession (New York: St Martin’s 
Griffin, 1995). 
4 André Corvisier, ‘Présence de la Guerre au XVIIe Siècle’, in Guerre et Paix dans 
l’Europe du XVIIe Siècle, ed. by Lucien Bély, Jean Bérenger and André Corvisier, 2 vols 
(Paris: S.E.D.E.S., 1991), I, pp. 13–27.
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was at the heart of these agreements of 1713–1714. Yet, inevitably, 
economic and trade disputes followed as a corollary.5 The territorial 
balance of power in Europe, established in 1713, was predicated on 
a commercial balance of trade on a global scale.6 Subsequently, trade 
issues occupied a  secondary place in the diplomatic management of 
the system. Incidents between British and French subjects overseas 
were not allowed to escalate into a rupture of political relations and 
were generally settled through normal diplomatic channels. Numerous 
reported incidents could have given rise to a conflict between Britain 
and France, but these were not allowed to poison the Franco-British 
rapport.7 In the years between 1716 and 1718, peace negotiations 
amending the treaties of Utrecht had priority over commercial quarrels.8
5 Antonella Alimento, ‘Commercial Treaties and the Harmonisation of National 
Interests: The Anglo-French Case (1667–1713)’, in War, Trade and Neutrality: Europe 
and the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. by Antonella 
Alimento (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2011), pp. 107–28; Armin Reese, Europäische 
Hegemonie und France d’outre-mer: Koloniale Fragen in der französischen Aussenpolitik 
1700–1763 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988). The Politics of Commercial Treaties in the 
Eighteenth Century. Balance of Power, Balance of trade, ed. by Antonella Alimento and 
Koen Stapelbroek (London: Palgrave, 2017).
6 See: Josiah Child, Discourse of Trade, Wherein is Recommended Several weighty Points 
relating to Companies of Merchants, the Act of Navigation, Naturalization of Strangers, 
and our Woollen Manufactures, the Ballance of Trade And the Nature of Plantations, 
and their Consequences, in Relation to the Kingdom, are Seriously Discusses, 3th edn 
(London: Sowle, 1718).
7 On harsh treatment suffered by French merchants in the Mediterranean at the 
hands of Vice-Admiral Cornwall, and complaints of the French fishing population 
of Boulogne and St Valéry sur Somme, see: Chammorel, London, 28 June 1717: 
AN, Marine, B1, 32, fols 447r–447v. Or, during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, 
Admiral Byng’s search of a French vessel destined for Alexandria, described as ‘the 
harshest and most unjust search operation ever’, see: de la Leurie, Naples, 13 December 
1718. Two other seizures, of the vessels of the French captains Roux and Audibert, 
described as ‘tyrannical’, were justified by the admiral by reference to an order of the 
Regent to seize all French ships transporting goods for Spain, see: de la Laurie, Naples, 
20 December 1718: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 21v. In the same vein: de Camp, The 
Hague, 29 December 1718: ibid., fol. 30v: French complaints of Dutch depredations 
should be temporarily disregarded, since treating them would hamper Franco-British 
attempts to lure the Republic into the Quadruple Alliance.
8 See: Chammorel’s report, 28 June 1717 on negotiations with James Craggs, 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department, o.c., fol. 447v: ‘[…] the crisis where 
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In reality, the commercial balance established at Utrecht seemed to be 
honoured more in the breach than in the observance.9 The present article 
examines the case of the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718–1720), 
whereby France and Britain intervened on the side of the Emperor against 
perceived Spanish aggression in Italy.10 This conflict discredits the idea of 
a ‘Second Hundred Years’ War’ between France and Britain from 1688 
to 1815. The French Regent, Philip of Orléans (nephew of Louis XIV), 
went to war against Louis’ own grandson, in alliance with a Protestant 
Maritime Power. All long-term economic, cultural and strategic interests 
seemed to pit Versailles and Hampton Court against one another. Yet the 
execution of the Treaty of Utrecht was a personal priority for both the 
Regent and George I, whose legitimacy was challenged by the Jacobite 
cause of the exiled ‘King James III’, James Francis Edward Stuart. 
This article argues in the first instance that the impact of military 
operations and diplomatic alliances on Mediterranean trade was only 
superficial, and that Franco-British commercial rivalry was firmly 
entrenched. French merchants and consuls’ complaints read as if the 
War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713, which saw France and Spain 
pitted against the Maritime Powers and the Habsburg Monarchy) was 
still in train.11 The following complaint from the aldermen and deputies 
negotiations on Italy are in at present will further prolong the resolutions we had 
hoped for a long time.’ Similar complaints on the breach of the dispositions in 
the Franco-English trade Convention of Utrecht (11 April 1713, Corps Universel 
Diplomatique du Droit des Gens (CUD) VIII/1, no. CLII, artt. XVIII–XX): ‘[…] 
although the English had insisted the most on phrasing the treaty in these terms, 
forcing us [France] to derogate to all our established ordinances […]’ (Memorandum 
of the Council of Commerce, 31 January 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 35r). 
9 See: de Camp, The Hague, 29 December 1718, o.c., fol. 30r: Dutch corsairs 
seize French vessels, ‘worth more than two millions [livres tournois]’ after the Treaty of 
Utrecht; ‘formally contravening’ the trade convention between France and the Dutch 
Republic. See art. VII, Treaty between Louis XIV and the Estates-General, Utrecht, 
11 April 1713, CUD VIII/1, no. CLVII, 378.
10 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, 4 vols, 3th edn (London: 
Butterworth, 1879–1889), II (1882), pp. 85–110; Núria Sallés, Giulio Alberoni y la 
Dirección de la Política Exterior Española después de los Tratados de Utrecht: 1715–1719 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Pompeu Fabra University, 2016).
11 See: Admiral Jennings’ complaints of French depredations in the Mediterranean, 
coupled with the disrespect of neutrality by states such as the Grand Duchy of 
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for commerce of Marseille illustrates the underlying tensions between 
French and British commercial interests, at a time when the Regent 
and George I combined to advance a common geopolitical goal. British 
private merchants and warships alike stopped and searched allied vessels:
The English actually have an overt trade in all ports of Spain […] they bring in all 
kinds of manufactured goods and food. Since the declaration of War [9 January 
1719] [v] His Majesty’s subjects have been forbidden access to these advantages […] 
their vessels pillaged and searched almost daily, and stopped by those belonging 
to the English nation without reverence or consideration for the French flag 
[pavilion].12 
In spite of public declarations of war, or the theoretical primacy of 
a nation’s self-preservation over advantages enjoyed by private individuals, 
the wartime suspension of trade was interpreted restrictively or avoided 
through indirect trade with neutrals.13 Conversely, even between allies, 
trade remained a zero-sum game of fierce competition.14 Partners in 
a common political undertaking were perceived to be as trustworthy 
as outside neutrals or enemies, ‘exploiting every occasion to thwart and 
ruin commerce and navigation.’15 According to Clairambault, French 
consul in Livorno, the reputation of the French nation as an intermediary 
for maritime transport was at stake – which he viewed as being more 
important than commercial damage to private owners. If British vessels 
were implicitly rendered safer, thereby profiting from the British military 
Tuscany. John S. Bromley, Corsairs and Navies (London: Hambledon Press, 1987), 
pp. 234–35.
12 Complaint by the Aldermen and Deputies for Commerce of Marseille, 3 and 
8 November 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 36, fols 342r–42v. 
13 Eric Schnakenbourg, Entre la Guerre et la Paix: Neutralité et Relations 
Internationales, XVIIe–XVIIIe Siècles (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013), 
p. 33. See, in the same vein, the difficulties regarding trade between the Maritime 
Powers and France during the War of the Spanish Succession: Bromley, pp. 42–72, 
213–42 and especially pp. 394–95. 
14 Memorandum by Clairambault (consul in Livorno) to the Regent, 20 January 
1719: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 46v. Excessive searches and seizures by France’s British 
ally on French vessels or on those of French trading partners, which ‘interrupts 
Commerce and Navigation.’ 
15 Clairambault, Livorno, 19 May 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 135v.
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fleet’s dominance, then France would have few commercial advantages 
to gain from a war in the Mediterranean.16
These general aggressive dynamics should not therefore reverse 
the intellectual order of priorities. Diplomats emphasised the need to 
preserve the balance of power first: individual merchants’ complaints 
regarding violations of trade regulations ranked a poor second. Actions 
by the navy or consuls could only be undone by ‘rigorous orders’ from 
London or Paris. ‘Respect for treaties and conventions’ was subject to 
the outcome of diplomatic negotiations.17
The secondary aim of this article is to show how geopolitical Grand 
Strategy had repercussions for trade policy and the legal language used 
to frame it, and, conversely, how a discourse of interdependence and 
free trade was so evident that all parties used it indiscriminately. Seizures 
were regularly portrayed as being violations of the ‘law of nations’.18 Yet 
individual claims were dependent on the political context, and primarily 
on the geopolitical changes brought about by the unusual situation of 
a Franco-British alliance. 
INTRICATE CONFLICTS
The harbours of the Kingdom of Naples daily see Frenchmen in Spanish service 
[…] of all kinds […] out of greed, deserters […] or on their way back to the 
kingdom after the declaration of war.19
Within three years of the final peace treaty of Baden (7 Septem-
ber 1714), Spain invaded the Austrian-controlled island of Sardinia 
(22 August 1717). The following year, Spanish troops landed on the 
island of Sicily, then ruled by the House of Savoy (1 July 1718). This 
was a direct attack on the peace settlement of 1713–1714. The Kingdom 
of Sardinia had been ceded by Spain to Emperor Charles VI under the 
16 See: consul Clairambault complaining on British stubbornness in releasing 
goods unlawfully seized on French vessels. (Clairambault, Livorno, 12 May 1719: 
AN, Marine, B1, 40, fols 137v–38r). 
17 Clairambault, Livorno, 16 June 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 152v. 
18 See: Portier, Tenerife, 13 May 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 156v (on the 
conservatory seizure of tobacco stocks belonging to French nationals). 
19 De la Leurie, Naples, 26 September 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 231r. 
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Treaty of Rastatt. The crown of Sicily was now in the possession of Victor 
Amadeus II of Savoy, again as a result of a Spanish concession.20 Philip V 
claimed that ongoing negotiations between Turin and Vienna to hand 
Sicily over to the Emperor were a violation of the right of reversion, 
which he had retained on the occasion of the Spanish-Savoyard peace 
treaty.21 In case the House of Savoy should leave Sicily, the island would 
revert to the crown of Spain. Yet none of this had been agreed or executed 
when Spanish troops landed on the island, which was poorly defended 
by Savoy.22 Philip merely acted out of a desire to protect Spanish 
interests, since the reversion right on Sardinia was worth less than that of 
Sicily.23 The island of Sardinia could act as a hub for a future invasion 
of Naples or Tuscany, and therefore was of considerable significance to the 
Spanish government.24
Charles VI was at war with the Ottomans in the Balkans at the 
same time (1716–1718). Consequently, the Emperor had to appeal for 
external assistance to withstand this Spanish assault on his Sardinian 
possession. France and Britain were willing to offer this. However, 
they were not prepared to inflict sanctions on Spain. Philip V and 
Elisabetta Farnese, along with Cardinal Alberoni, had astutely invoked 
Italian frustration at Imperial encroachments on princely liberties.25 The 
20 Elisa Mongiano, ‘Universae Europae Securitas’: I Trattati di Cessione della Sardegna 
a Vittorio Amedeo II di Savoia (Turin: Giappichelli Editore, 1995).
21 Considérations sur la Guerre d’Italie ([n.p.]: [n. pub.], [1718]); Treaty of Peace 
between Philip V and Victor Amadeus of Savoy, Utrecht, 13 August 1713, CUD 
VIII/1, no. CXLVI, 403, art. VI.
22 Christopher Storrs, War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 72.
23 Mercure historique et politique, Contenant l’état présent de l’Europe, ce qui se 
passe dans toutes les Cours, l’Intérêt des Princes, leurs Brigues, & généralement tout ce 
qu’il y a de curieux pour le Mois de Janvier 1719 (The Hague: Les Frères Van Dole, 
1719), p. 86. Other motives, such as the arrest of Molinez in the Duchy of Milan, 
were deployed as casus belli. In the latter case, the Emperor, as Duke of Milan, had 
respected ecclesiastical privilegium fori, see: Considérations sur la guerre d’Italie, p. 24. 
Imperial assistance to the Catalan and Majorcan rebellions were complaints dating 
from the closing years of the War of the Spanish Succession, see: ibid., p. 29. 
24 Abbé de Vayrac, État présent de l’Espagne, où l’on voit une géographie historique 
du Pays, 4 vols. (Amsterdam: Steenhouwer & Uytwerp, 1719), III, p. 326. 
25 Considérations sur la guerre d’Italie, pp. 7, 11, 55.
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Franco-British war aims did not go beyond the restoration of the balance 
of power on the Italian peninsula. The British Fleet under Admiral Byng 
quickly destroyed its Spanish counterpart at the Battle of Cape Passaro 
(11 August 1718). As a result, it was clear that Philip V would no longer 
enjoy the upper hand in the war. France and Britain had negotiated 
the criteria for a peace settlement with Charles VI. Austria and Savoy 
would exchange the kingdoms of Sardinia and Sicily. However, Spain 
would obtain the promised succession of Philip V’s second son, Don 
Carlos,26 to the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza and the Grand Duchy 
of Tuscany.27 Therefore, with the Duke of Savoy moving to Sardinia, 
the balance of power in Italy would not be endangered.28 
From the moment Cardinal Alberoni (1664–1752)29 was dismissed 
as Prime Minister (5 December 1719), France and Britain had every 
26 The future Charles VII of Naples and Charles III of Spain. Giuseppe Caridi, 
Carlo III: Un Grande Re Riformatore a Napoli e in Spagna (Rome: Salerno, 2014). 
27 Riguccio Galluzzi, Histoire du grand duché de Toscane, sous le gouvernement des 
Médicis, traduite de l’italien, 9 vols (Paris: Hôtel Serpente, 1782–1784), IX (1784); 
Jean-Claude Waquet, Le grand-duché de Toscane sous les derniers Médicis: Essai sur le 
système des finances et la stabilité des institutions dans les anciens États italiens (Rome/
Paris: Ecole Française de Rome/De Boccard, 1990); Emanuele Salerno, ‘Stare Pactis 
and Neutrality: Grotius and Pufendorf in the Political Thought of the Early Eighteenth 
Century Grand Duchy of Tuscany’, in War, Trade and Neutrality, pp. 188–202. 
These territories were dynastically linked with Spain through Philip V’s second 
marriage to Elisabetta Farnese, niece of the then-Duke of Parma, Francesco Farnese: 
see: Christopher Storrs, ‘The Spanish Risorgimento in the Western Mediterranean 
and Italy 1707–1748’, European History Quarterly, 62 (2012), 555–77; Christopher 
Storrs, The Spanish Resurgence, 1713–1748 (Cambridge: Yale University Press, 2017).
28 Francesca Fausta Gallo, ‘Una Difficile Fedeltà: L’Italia durante la Guerra di 
Successione Spagnola’, Cheiron, 39–40 (2004), 245–66; Derek McKay, ‘Bolingbroke, 
Oxford and the Defence of the Utrecht Settlement in Southern Europe’, English 
Historical Review, 86 (1971), 264–84.
29 Émile Bourgeois, La Diplomatie Secrète au XVIIIe Siècle, Ses Débuts: II. Le 
Secret des Farnèse, Philippe V et la Politique d’Alberoni (Paris: Armand Colin, 1909); 
Simon Harcourt-Smith, Cardinal of Spain: The Life and Strange Career of Giulio 
Alberoni (New York: Knopf, 1955); Pietro Castagnoli, Il Cardinale Giulio Alberoni, 
3 vols (Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1929), I; Mil. R. Vesnitch, ‘Cardinal Alberoni: 
An Italian Precursor of Pacifism and International Arbitration’, The American Journal 
of International Law, 8 (1913), 51–82. Alberoni fled to Genoa, where the Republic 
did not intend to extradite him to Spain, see: Émile Vincens, Histoire de la République 
de Gènes, 4 vols (Paris: F. Didot, 1842), III, p. 262.
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motivation to restore good relations with the Spanish crown, if only 
in order to reinstate bilateral trade.30 The Parmezan Prime Minister in 
Madrid was a convenient scapegoat for the French and British courts. 
Dynastic and domestic considerations could explain this. Philip V, 
grandson of Louis XIV, was a Bourbon prince.31 Philip of Orléans, 
who acted as Regent during Louis XV’s minority (until February 
1723)32 could not afford to alienate the traditionalist factions at court 
in Paris, and also had to face regional unrest in Brittany.33 Moreover, 
the captains of privately-owned French ships34, captains 35and sailors 
were enlisting with Philip V36 or were engaged in carrying his troops 
across the Mediterranean.37 When famine struck Majorca, French 
merchants rapidly provided the island with the necessary grain.38 
After issuing a first recalling Ordinance,39 the Regent considered it 
30 Act of Accession to the Quadruple Alliance by Philip V, accepted by the 
signatory powers to the Treaty of London, The Hague, 17 February 1720, CUD 
VIII/2, no. XI, 26. 
31 La Présence des Bourbons en Europe, XVIe–XXIe Siècle, ed. by Lucien Bély (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2003). 
32 Alexandre Dupilet, La Régence Absolue: Philippe d’Orléans et la Polysynodie 
(Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2011).
33 E.g. mobilising the British fleet to patrol off Brittany: Stair to Craggs, Paris, 
31 May 1719: NA, SP, 78, 164, fol. 86r; Pierre de La Condamine, Pontcallec: Une 
Étrange Conspiration au Cœur de la Bretagne ([Mayenne]: Y. Floc’h, 1988). 
34 E.g. Circular by the Regent to enjoin French privateers under the Spanish 
flag to cease their ‘intolerable’ activities, or accept the consequences of treatment as 
‘deserters’. AN, B1, Marine, 40, fols 45v–46r. 
35 Barber (Cadiz), 9 September 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 229r. 
36 See: report of 5 December 1717, Barcelona in AN, Marine, B1, 32, fol. 5v. 
French captains from Toulon participated in the expedition on Sardinia under Spanish 
pavilion, and hoisted the French flag again afterwards. See: report by de Varennes 
(Alicante) on French sailors serving on a Spanish man of war, captured by the British 
fleet in a fight off the Spanish coast (AN, Marine B1, 40, fol. 35v). 
37 Aubert (Genoa), 3 January 1719: English complaints on Spanish troops 
transported aboard two French vessels. AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 20v. 
38 Nieulon fils, Mallorca, 17 August 1719: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 214r. 
39 Ordinance of Louis XV enjoining his subjects in Spain to come back to 
France immediately after publication, yet granting a delay of six months to all 
French merchants presently in Spain to stay there for six more months, in order 
to withdraw, sell or transport their goods and properties, Paris, 10 January 1719; 
Ordinance of Louis XV permitting Spanish subjects to stay in France for six months, 
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advantageous to grant amnesty to disobedient subjects.40 Finally, from 
a French perspective, the Emperor could not be allowed to become too 
powerful. The peace settlements of 1713–1714 aimed to establish and 
to preserve an equitable repartition of territories in Europe between the 
two main rival houses: those of Habsburg and Bourbon.41 France and 
Britain acted as mediators between Charles VI and Philip V.42 Neither 
Philip or Charles had accepted the idea of a partition of the Spanish 
composite monarchy. Accordingly, they demanded a general conference 
to conclude a final peace treaty between them and to implement all the 
terms of the multilateral agreement concluded in London on 2 August 
1718 N.S., known as the ‘Quadruple Alliance’.43
During the military operations, trade in the Mediterranean was 
a point of significant interest. Firstly, although Italy had long been an 
object of external powers’ political appetites, and was ‘covered with 
foreign troops’, this did not imply that the peninsula had fallen into 
economic oblivion.44 As Pietro Tosini’s 1718 pamphlet – defending Italy’s 
liberties against ungrateful and avaricious neighbouring peoples – put 
it, ‘Barbarous Nations have not been humanised but through the Italian 
trade’, spreading ‘arts, sciences and the most considerable advantages’ 
in order to sell or transport their belongings, Paris, 10 January 1719; Ordinance of 
Louis XV permitting his subjects to travel to collect their properties and goods in 
Spain, to bring them back to the Kingdom within six months from 10 January, Paris, 
6 March 1719. 
40 Chavigny, Genoa, 4 October 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 289r. See Draft 
ordinance to facilitate the return of Frenchmen in the Kingdom, of any profession, 
after leaving for Italy or other states, AN, Marine, B1, 40, fols 227r–29r. 
41 Frederik Dhondt, ‘From Contract to Treaty: The Legal Transformation of the 
Spanish Succession, 1659–1713’, Journal of the History of International Law – Revue 
d’Histoire du Droit International, 13 (2011), 347–75; Jean Bérenger, ‘Le Conflit 
entre les Habsbourg et les Bourbons (1598–1792)’, Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, 
116 (2002), 192–232.
42 Considérations sur la guerre d’Italie, p. 18.
43 Treaty of Alliance between Charles VI, Louis XV and George I, London, 
2 August 1718, CUD VIII/1, no. CCII, 531. France, Britain and the Emperor were 
the initial parties to the agreement. Savoy adhered in November 1718, but the fourth 
place was destined for the Dutch.
44 Pietro Tosini, La liberté de l’Italie demontrée à ses princes et à ses peuples, traduite 
de l’Italien (Amsterdam: Steenhouwer & Uytwerf, 1718), p. 3.
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across Europe.45 Secondly, both the bilateral Franco-Spanish and Anglo- 
-Spanish trade flows were considerable.46 Outside of Spain itself, the 
de jure suspension of commercial relations was often accompanied by 
confiscations throughout the Spanish commercial empire.47 
PHILIP V, OR THE COMMERCIAL  
POLITICS OF ‘DIVIDE ET IMPERA’
As the war progressed from the summer of 1718 to the winter of 
1719–1720, its outcome was predictable but far from certain. The 
main ministerial protagonists, James, Earl of Stanhope (effectively Prime 
Minister of Great Britain)48 and the abbé Guillaume Dubois (French 
secretary of state for foreign affairs, and the most influential member 
of the French government),49 were constantly caught between hopes 
45 Ibid., p. 9: ‘Les Nations Barbares n’ont été humanisées que par le Commerce des 
Italiens, et ne se sont enrichies que des bienfaits dont ils ont été prodigues envers elles.’
46 Considérations sur la guerre d’Italie, p. 42. Not to mention direct debts payable in 
France, e.g. ‘Cardinal Alberoni declared only recently to the Duke of Saint Aignan that 
the King of Spain would pay no debt whatsoever as long as he would be at war […]’ 
(Catalan, French informant in Madrid to the Marine Council, 6 December 1717: AN, 
Marine, B1, 32, fol. 1r. See complaints of the violation of French privileges (quartering 
of soldiers, De Moy, Barcelona) in: ibid., fol. 3r. Ralph Davis, ‘English Foreign Trade 
1700–1774’, Economic History Review, 15 (1962), 285–303 (pp. 287–88, 293, 301–03). 
J.O. Maclachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1940); François Crouzet, ‘La Rivalité Commerciale Franco-Anglaise 
dans l’Empire Espagnol, 1713–1789’, Histoire, Économie et Société, 31 (2012), 19–29. 
Crouzet’s article estimates French exports to Spain at 19,3 million livres tournois for the 
years from 1716 to 1720. British exports would have been worth around 10,3 million.
47 See: report from Cadiz, 30 Oct 1717: Diego Navarro, intendant for tobacco, 
had seized 200.000 piastres belonging to the French ‘nation’. The damage to French 
interests was even more important since ‘this judge has neither credit nor money’. 
(AN, Marine, B1, 32, fol. 7r). 
48 Basil Williams, Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932). 
49 Alexandre Dupilet, Le Cardinal Dubois: Le Génie Politique de la Régence 
(Paris: Tallandier, 2015); Émile Bourgeois, La Diplomatie Secrète au XVIIIe Siècle, 
Ses Débuts: I. Le Secret du Régent et la Politique de l’Abbé Dubois (Triple et Quadruple 
Alliance) (1716–1718) (Paris: Colin, 1909); Émile Bourgeois, La Diplomatie Secrète 
au XVIIIe Siècle, Ses Débuts: III. Le Secret de Dubois, Cardinal et Premier Ministre 
(Paris: A. Colin, 1910); Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, Le Cardinal Dubois, 1656–1723 
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of success and fears of failure, providing an insight into both men’s 
domestic political position. They had each built their careers by gradually 
discarding opposing factions. As the outcome of military operations was 
always uncertain, their letters incorporated all possible alternatives, and 
also reveal the structure and the course of international crises. Spain 
tried to play both mediators against each other, by applying different 
measures to similar situations. The Spanish ambassador in London, 
Monteleón,50 intimidated the directors of the South Sea Company.51 
As a result, British merchants and traders feared confiscations,52 and 
hid their assets in storehouses ‘of the Flemish or French’ nations.53 
French merchants, by contrast, had obtained a decree from Philip V 
dated 9 November 1718, whereby their effects were safeguarded from 
confiscation,54 and their vessels rendered immune from Spanish search-
es.55 This served to quell a genuine fear in France, due to the potential 
economic consequences of a rupture with Spain.56 Nonetheless, this 
fear was common to both belligerents. Philip V desired to let trade 
continue,57 if only for the necessary imports of goods not produced 
ou une Certaine Idée de l’Europe (Paris: Perrin, 2000); Frederik Dhondt, ‘Kardinaal 
Dubois door Hyacinthe Rigaud (1723): Een Insider’s View op een Bibliotheek van 
de Macht in de Grand Siècle’, Pro Memorie: Bijdragen tot de Rechtsgeschiedenis der 
Nederlanden, 16 (2014), 45–54. 
50 Isidro Casado y Rosales, marquis de Monteleon (1663–1733). Ambassador in 
Rome 1708–1709, third Spanish plenipotentiary at Utrecht, ambassador in London 
1714. Sicilian native in Spanish service. Didier Ozanam and Denise Ozanam, Les 
Diplomates Espagnols au XVIIIe Siècle (Madrid/Bordeaux: Casa de Velázquez/Maison 
des Pays Ibériques, 1998), p. 217.
51 Robert R. McJimsey, ‘Shaping the Revolution in Foreign Policy: Parliament 
and the Press, 1689–1730’, Parliamentary History, 25 (2006), 17–31 (p. 27).
52 E.g. immediate seizure of all British goods on the Canaries, inspiring fear 
among the inhabitants, ‘whose only richess consists in their wines, the majority of 
them destined for the British market’ (Portier, Tenerife, 24 February 1719: AN, 
Marine, B1, 40, fol. 112r). 
53 AN, Marine, B1, 32, fol. 449r. 
54 Brigodet de Varennes, Alicante, 28 November 1718: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 2r. 
55 de l’Epinard, Messina, 17 December 1718: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 47v. 
56 ‘The French had for 20 million livres tournois in Spain. If they were to be 
confiscated, this would inflict a terrible blow on the Regent, who needed time to withdraw 
them’ (Stair to James Stanhope, Paris, 5 October 1718: NA, SP, 78, 162, fol. 207r) 
57 Royal Decree by Philip V, Madrid, 10 February 1719, quoted in the report 
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in his realms,58 such as textiles.59 However, this offers us a further 
possibility to contrast Spanish complaisance and generosity towards 
French merchants with the comparatively dominant and aggressive 
British stance. As a consequence, from January 1719, Philip decided to 
reinforce the Spanish party in France and to put pressure on the Regent 
to withdraw from the coalition. 
The case of Messina is of particular interest. Spanish troops landed 
on the island of Sicily on 1 July 1718. Fifteen months later, Imperial 
troops under Mercy d’Argenteau (1666–1734) reconquered almost the 
whole kingdom, in October 1719. Already in January 1719, de l’Epinard 
had reported that the Spanish commander, Spinola, had barely enough 
supplies for a month. However, in the meantime, French merchants 
provided clothing and tents, imported from Nîmes and Anduze, to 
the army of Jean-François de la Bette, Marquis de Lede (1668–1725), 
commander of Spanish forces in the Mediterranean and also Philip V’s 
appointee as Viceroy of Sicily.60 The negotiations for these supplies had 
been concluded before January 1719 and the French declaration of 
war on Spain. The arrangement could thus be carried out. Moreover, 
the Regent considered Sicily to be a possession of the Emperor, even 
before the treaty of exchange with Sardinia had been signed. This was 
on the basis of Savoy’s accession to the Quadruple Alliance, article VI 
of which foresaw the Spanish renunciation of the right of reversion on 
Sicily and its transfer to the Austrian Habsburgs.61
of Nieulon fils, Mallorca, 18 February 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 84v. E.g. 
French vessels regularly arriving in Mallorca with grains, whereas military operations 
on Spanish soils had already begun by January 1719 (Nieulon fils, Mallorca, 9 July 
1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 199r). 
58 Vayrac, III, p. 317. Attempts to set up manufacturing industries with labourers 
from Holland or France illustrate a desire on the part of Alberoni and the Duke of 
Ripperda. See also: Davis, 285–303 (p. 295).
59 See: Aubert, Genoa, 16 May 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 136v, on 
a Neapolitan corsair stopping a French merchant vessel sailing from Saint-Tropez to 
Barcelona carrying 1300 Spanish uniforms. The French consul hoped these goods 
could be qualified as ordinary trade stock, since they had been exempted in the 
Franco-British Treaty of Commerce concluded at Utrecht (art. XII, CUD VIII/1, 348). 
60 de l’Epinard, Messina, 10 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 103r. 
61 Act of Paris, 8 October 1718; Act of London, 8 November 1718; Act of 
Vienna, 2 November 1718, CUD VIII/1, no. CCVI, 549. 
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News gradually reached Paris that the Spanish authorities were seizing 
stocks or compelling their sale to the Spanish crown at a lower price. 
Spanish promises were thus seen as unreliable.62 The Council of the 
Marine asked French consuls in Spain to encourage their merchants to 
evacuate and repair to France as soon as possible.63 As the war effort 
strained Spanish resources, higher taxation64 (or confiscations of French 
vessels) became inevitable.65 As the French army, under the Duke of 
Berwick, invaded Guipuzcoa and Galicia, the Spanish governor accused 
French merchants who brought their belongings to safety of insulting the 
trustworthiness of Philip V’s decree, which ostensibly protected them.66 
Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean, Admiral Byng’s fleet regularly harassed 
French commercial vessels bound for Sicily or Sardinia, declaring all 
of them suspect. This reflected the perceived favouritism with which 
Spain was treating France.67
PRIVATEERING BETWEEN OUTSOURCED PUBLIC  
AUTHORITY AND INDIVIDUAL GREED
Private merchants of France’s allies treat the King’s subjects as enemies and entirely 
ruin their commerce and navigation in the Mediterranean.68
Privateering can be seen as an aspect of states’ external military power, 
or at least the power to harm enemy trade.69 Military vessels could of 
62 Portier, Tenerife, 24 February 1719, o.c., fol. 112r. 
63 E.g. Domas, Cartagena, 17 April 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 139r. 
64 Du Pin, Alicante: AN, marine, B1, 40, fol. 130v. 
65 Barber, Cadiz: 21 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 126v. 
66 Barber, Cadiz, 19 May 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 148r. 
67 Clairambault, Livorno, 16 June 1719, o.c., fol. 151v; De la Leurie, Naples, 
15 May 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 140v. Another example in his letter dated 
23 May 1719 (ibid., fol. 141r): a French vessel left Palermo after a commercial mission. 
It drifted off in a storm near Milazzo and had to look for Spanish help. Yet, ‘German’ 
(Austrian) forces intercepted it off the coast of Naples, jailing the crew. Viceroy Daun 
promised to release them, but judicial proceedings in Naples dragged on and on. 
68 De la Chausse, Rome, 14 November 1719: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 296r. 
69 Louis XIV urged James II to issue letters of marque to Jacobites during the Nine 
Years’ War, in view of privateering’s strategic impact; see also Vauban’s Mémoire sur la 
Caprerie. In the Jacobite case, privateering was based on ‘the right of a deposed king 
to wage war’ and thus constituted a means of prolonging a civil war on the high seas. 
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course conduct search operations, either as part of the fleet patrolling 
the Mediterranean,70 or from bases such as Port Mahon or Gibraltar, 
which Britain had captured during the War of the Spanish Succession 
and had retained under the Treaty of Utrecht.71 However, beyond the 
limitations of the Royal Navy’s actions and responsibilities, privateers 
could constitute an effective alternative. Private individuals exercised 
public authority, stimulated by potential private profits in the name of 
a public cause.72 The rules governing their conduct were derived from 
public law, and not from private law.73 Letters of marque were granted 
irrespective of the recipients’ nationality. Catalans, subjects of the King 
of Spain, could harass French vessels in the free port of Livorno,74 
acting as privateers from Naples in the name of Emperor Charles VI, 
See: Bromley, pp. 140, 165 and 217. Jacobite and French privateering accompanied 
the failed attempt by Forbin to bring the Old Pretender ashore in Scotland in March 
1708, a movement which caused a genuine ‘run on the Bank of England’. Bromley 
abundantly illustrated the quasi-global impact of privateering during the War of the 
Spanish Succession. Furthermore, taxes or duties due to the state (e.g. the Zealand 
public authorities or the Amiral de France) generated supplementary benefits for the 
state in encouraging a system of privateering. In Britain, the Lord High Admiral 
surrendered his tenth (10%) of the net property (i.e. after payment of all dues and 
charges) of a prize to the Crown, which in turn abandoned this further claim altogether 
in the 1708 Prize Act (Bromley, p. 464).
70 E.g. French accusations against admiral Byng ‘by the profit he reaps from 
vexations’ (Clairambault, Livorno, 20 January 1719, o.c. 
71 Complaints by de Moy, Barcelona, 4 February 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 49v. 
72 Gary M. Anderson and Adam Gifford Jr., ‘Privateering and the Private Production 
of Naval Power’, Cato Journal, 11 (1991–1992), 99–122.
73 Cornelius Van Bynkershoek, Quaestionum iuris publici libri duo, trans. by 
Tenney Frank (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1930 [1737]), p. 104. Nevertheless, 
the business partnerships and ventures set up to finance a privateering expeditions fall 
under private law, see: Bromley, pp. 64–65. Investment in privateering and maritime 
transport was widespread in Britain, and concerned countryside landowners (‘from Kent 
to Scotland’) as well as traditional merchants in trading ports. Various motivations led 
to activity in the privateering ‘business’, ranging from ‘speculative investment which 
could bring windfall profits’, over ‘an outlet for resources otherwise damned up by 
war’ to ‘humbly […] an expression of local poverty’, see: Bromley, p. 215.
74 Wolfgang Kaiser and Guillaume Calafat, ‘Violence, Protection and Commerce: 
Corsairing and Ars Piratica in the Early Modern Mediterranean’, in Persistent Piracy: 
Maritime Violence and State Formation in Global Historical Perspective, ed. by Stefan 
Amirell and Leos Müller (London: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 69–92 (p. 74).
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who had set up his court in Barcelona during the War of the Spanish 
Succession!75 In essence, the Neapolitan authorities granted privateering 
commissions to anybody, without even asking for a proper guarantee. 
Penniless Catalans and Majorcan refugees eagerly enlisted, hoping to 
re-establish themselves by terrorising the Mediterranean.76 
Courts and tribunals could determine the legality of seizures effected 
in national ports.77 Neutral vessels were not immune from searches. ‘Free 
ship, free goods’ could only be a prudent wish.78 Trade politics in terms 
of the customs established by reciprocity seemed impossible between 
strong and weaker parties.79 Conventional or doctrinal definitions of 
contraband were vague, privileges precarious, and the perpetual object 
of a political rapport de force. References to general principles served to 
encourage the Regent to take diplomatic action, rather than to place 
his trust in judicial institutions controlled by another power. De la 
Leurie’s description of an incident in December 1718, before the French 
declaration of war, is telling: 
[…] commerce not having been interrupted, the French could load and navigate for 
any destination without being arrested […] If there had to come about a rupture 
[between England and France], there were Treaties and Laws to be followed, 
ordering French vessels to be released.80
Even cargoes of grains, sugar or French cheese were stopped!81 
One might imagine that privateers should stop only ‘enemies, and not 
75 Clairambault, Livorno, 2 June 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 143r. 
76 De la Leurie, Naples, 23 June 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fols 161v–62r. 
77 AN, Marine, B1, 36, fol. 132r. 
78 E.g. de Rochefort, Stockholm, 13 January 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 41r: 
Charles XII of Sweden urges his nations’ privateers to respect the rights of neutrals 
and limit their actions to the country’s enemies. On the emergence of this principle, 
see: Schnakenbourg, p. 97.
79 Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Between Utrecht and the War of the Austrian Succession: The 
Dutch Translation of the British Merchant of 1728’, History of European Ideas, 40 (2014), 
1026–43 (p. 1040). Ollivier, Palermo, 18 August 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 219v. 
80 De la Leurie, Naples, 20 December 1718: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 22r. 
81 Clairambault, Livorno, 26 May 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 139v; de la 
Leurie, Naples, 7 October 1719: ibid., fol. 259r. For similar French seizures of Genoese 
neutral cargoes set for enemy-controlled Barcelona or Lisbon during the War of the 
Spanish Succession, see: Bromley, p. 235.
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friends’.82 If principles or past agreements were to have any value, they 
needed to be reaffirmed time and time again: ‘If we do not oppose these 
kinds of acts, the [French] nation will be exposed daily to new insults, and 
eventually to the loss of her privileges.’83 The law of nations in general 
was thus seen as insufficient to provide individuals with efficient legal 
protection.84 Only bilateral, repeatedly asserted privileges could do so. 
In practice, belligerents looked for enemy goods on any ship.85 
‘Contrary to all treaties […] the ‘slightest indication of any merchandise’s 
pertaining to a subject of the King of Spain’ was enough to trigger 
avaricious British marines or privateers to search for and to confiscate 
the said merchandise.86 This intimidated merchants from the Languedoc 
and Provence. In Livorno, meanwhile, the British consul was withhold-
ing French assets, ‘violating the treaties of Utrecht and the most exact 
justice’.87 British subjects sailed under Spanish commissions, harming 
French trade. Blank Spanish passports were auctioned at the London 
Stock Exchange, having been gladly distributed by Philip V.88 Nonethe-
less, the British fleet at times correctly applied the law of nations with 
regard to privateering.89 Although the Regent did not want to endanger 
82 Bynkershoek, p. 111.
83 Portier (Tenerife), 24 February 1719, o.c., fol. 112v. 
84 Robert Kolb, ‘The Protection of the Individual in Times of War and Peace’, 
in Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, ed. by Bardo Fassbender 
and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 317-337 (p. 319); 
Dominique Gaurier, Histoire du Droit International (Rennes: Presses Universitaires 
de Rennes, 2014), p. 810.
85 AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 1r. Report by Partyet (Cadiz) on Spanish practices 
of indiscriminately searching English and other nations’ vessels for English goods. 
Clairambault, Livorno, 20 January 1719) accused the English consul in Livorno of 
blackmail. He would have demanded a fixed fee of 2% on French assets in exchange 
of a certificate of property, as immunity against searches conducted by Admiral Byng. 
In a similar case, whereby two French vessels were accordingly unjustly retained by 
Admiral Byng, the English consul demanded a 5% fee, ‘vexation inouïe’ (Clairambault, 
Livorno, 7 April 1719: ibid., fol. 113v). 
86 De Moy, Barcelona, 4 February 1719, o.c., fol. 49v. 
87 Clairambault, Livorno, 15 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 95v. 
88 Chammorel, London, 12 November 1719: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 271v; Barber, 
Cadiz, 2 September 1719: ibid., fol. 263v. 
89 De la Leurie, Naples, 4 April 1719: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 118r. The French 
vessel Nostre Dame left Palermo for Barcelona carrying correspondence (among which 
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his diplomatic relationship with Britain, he issued a protectionist 
ordinance on 10 July 1719, enjoining the King’s subjects to only entrust 
goods to vessels under the French flag, and to return home.90
NEAPOLITAN AND BRITISH DISORDERS
How much are we hurt by those petty corsairs under the Imperial flag?91
The Archives Nationales in Paris contain numerous complaints of 
private merchants concerning brigandage in the Mediterranean. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Italian privateering posed a more significant threat than 
was the case for Spain, a belligerent. The Kingdom of Naples – under 
the sovereignty of Charles VI, an ally of France and Britain – was 
described as the most dangerous nest of corsairs. The Austrian Habsburg 
dynasty had controlled Naples since Joseph I’s troops had driven out 
the Spanish forces of Philip V in 1707. Wirich Philipp, Count of 
Daun (1669–1741) acted as its governor. The Kingdom did not return 
to Spanish hands until 1733–1734.92 Privateering activities could of 
course be explained by the ongoing Austro-Ottoman war, which lasted 
until the peace of Passarowitz (21 July 1718).93 To the extent whereby 
French vessels were transporting Turks, or goods for trading in the 
Levant, Charles VI’s corsairs could intercept part of the Ottoman army’s 
logistical support. 
a letter to Philip V), but was caught in bad weather and had to divert to Cape Passaro, 
where the British man o’ war The Grafton intercepted her. The crew and captain were 
released and given back their belongings and money in Naples.
90 Ordinance by Louis XV, executing those of his predecessor issued on 7 January 
1689 and 5 April 1713, forbidding all subjects resident in the Levant, Barbary and 
the ports of Italy, to embark goods on alien vessels not sailing under the French flag, 
Paris, 10 July 1719. 
91 Regent to Dubois, 7 August 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 192v. 
92 Angelantonio Spagnoletti, ‘Il Dibattito Politico a Napoli sulla Successione di 
Spagna’, Cheiron, 39–40 (2004), 267–310; Franz Pesendorfer, Österreich-Grossmacht 
im Mittelmeer? Das Königreich Neapel-Sizilien unter Kaiser Karl VI (1707/20–1734/35) 
(Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1998); Guido Quazza, Il Problema Italiano e l’Equilibrio 
Europeo, 1720–1738 (Turin: Deputazione Subalpina di Storia Patria, 1965).
93 Peace Treaty between Charles VI, Sultan Ahmet and the Republic of Venice, 
Passarowitz, 21 July 1718, CUD VIII/1, no. CXIX, 520. 
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However, in many cases the Neapolitan privateers acted outside any 
legal framework, often to ‘pillage the most valuable goods’ from passing 
vessels,94 or to unjustly retain the Sultan’s subjects after peace had been 
concluded, ‘against all laws of nations’.95 In the case of the ship-owner 
Moret, who had been captured by the Neapolitan corsair Palombo, the 
French resident in Livorno complained that the latter had searched 
the vessel and confiscated part of the cargo ‘without the slightest pretext’. 
Palombo conducted the vessel to Civitavecchia in the Papal States, 
but neither Pope Clement XI (embroiled with Spain) nor his officers 
manifested impartiality.96 In another incident, the French merchant 
Magnan sailed from Calabria to Naples on behalf of Genoese clients, but 
was caught by a Neapolitan privateer who argued that his cargo was to be 
declared ‘de bonne prise’ on the basis of Spanish cargo bills for an earlier 
voyage to Tenerife. The Tartanne, a vessel owned by the French privateer 
Martinenq, was seized by a Neapolitan corsair and released again, save 
for part of its cargo supposedly destined for Spain as contraband.97 The 
goods were subsequently sold off to British tradesmen, in violation of 
the Quadruple Alliance between the Emperor, France and Britain.98
As the Emperor was able to withdraw his troops from the Balkans in 
order to face the Spaniards in Sicily, Daun ordered the confiscation of any 
vessel capable of transporting troops, including those armed by subjects 
of allied powers, such as France.99 France and Austria agreed on mutual 
regulations concerning seizures, rendering the latter merely conservatory 
in case of doubt.100 A French vessel containing 600 barrels of powder was 
captured by a Neapolitan corsair off Corsica. Its listed destination was 
Malta. The case was solved by the Emperor’s envoy Maricon in Genoa. 
94 De la Leurie, Naples, 14 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 110r. 
95 Ibid. The Regent insisted that ‘no trial whatsoever’ should take place and called 
for the immediate release of the Sultan’s subjects. 
96 Report by Clairambault from Livorno, 17 June 1717: AN, Marine, B1, 32, 
fols 503r–03v. See also: de la Leurie, Naples, 13 December 1718: AN, Marine, B1, 
40, fol. 16v. 
97 Ibid., report by Nieuton, Mallorca, 17 December 1718. 
98 AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 36r. 
99 De la Leurie, Naples, 14 February 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 79r. 
100 Coutlet, Genoa, 28 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 99r; Ibid., 10 April 
1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 113v. 
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He agreed in principle to release the French vessel. Yet, while the ammu-
nition and the bills of cargo were being verified in Genoa, the French 
captain had to sail to Naples in order to transport troops for Daun.
Neapolitan seizures were transferred to Jean Baptiste du Bourg 
(1690–1728), the French resident in Vienna, who presented these 
cases to the Imperial court.101 Unfortunately, Emperor Charles VI in 
turn referred all such cases to the Spanish Council, which was packed 
with his personal creatures,102 in a manner reminiscent of his brief 
reign in Spain: ‘The Neapolitans are des gens ramassez, who cannot be 
restrained by any rule of law, yet they are protected by these people, who 
will never let them give back what they have taken.’103 At the peak of 
British depredations, Admiral Byng’s practices were seen as inspiration 
for the disorderly behaviour of Neapolitan corsairs!104 On one occasion 
in 1719, corsairs from Naples seized a Spanish ship carrying diplomatic 
correspondence from Venice and handed it over to the British fleet off 
the coast of Sicily, in order to get their share of the sale.105 Whoever 
came across their path was a possible target. The protection of the 
corsair Palombo was more effective than the Neapolitan or Imperial 
court’s desire for justice. French consuls repeatedly insisted that the 
Neapolitan magistrates took a personal interest in every privateering 
commission they delivered.106 One of the detainees died ‘a death of 
misery’. Palombo’s protectors, as de la Leurie insinuated, had received 
their share of his bounty.107 This did not imply that all French cases 
were lost, e.g. that of Arnauld, who obtained the restitution of his 
101 Du Bourg, Vienna, 25 April 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 102r. 
102 Virginia León Sanz, Carlos VI: El Emperador que no pudo ser Rey de España 
(Madrid: Aguilar, 2003). 
103 Du Bourg, 25 April 1719, o.c., fol. 102v. 
104 Aubert, Genoa, 27 June 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 188v: ‘[…] the 
Neapolitans, following the example of the English, use any possible act of power to 
interrupt French trade and navigation […]’. 
105 de l’Epinard, Messina, 3 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 110v. The 
Spanish captain was jailed by the British, who accused him of negligence. In their 
eyes, he should have thrown the diplomatic papers overboard to prevent their capture.
106 de la Leurie, Naples, 13 June 1719, o.c., fol. 162r: ‘[…] les corsaires sont 
protegez par des ministres qui sont mesme interessez sous main dans les armemens, 
de sorts qu’il est impossible d’avoir aucune raison de leurs Brigandages […]’. 
107 De la Leurie, Naples, 28 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 114v. 
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vessel, as well as compensation for the harm inflicted by a Neapolitan 
corsair, by sentence of the Royal Chamber of Naples.108 Outside these 
intricate networks of reported Neapolitan corruption, Imperial envoys 
tried to bring their unruly subjects to reason, e.g. enjoining them 
to appear before local judges in Genoa,109 or offering compensation 
to wronged merchants for damage caused by Italian privateers.110
In Spain’s case, the use of private agents to protect the colonial empire 
is a familiar topic to economic and political historians.111 Lacking the 
top-down military means to exclude foreign merchants, private help 
could fill the gaps.112 Disregarding their nationality, even British subjects 
were reported to have served as privateers for Philip V, thereby damaging 
the trade of their own compatriots.113 Meanwhile, building up a stronger 
centralised system of government, while embracing mercantilism and 
protectionist policies, would allow the Spanish crown to better exploit 
its commercial assets.114 During an armed conflict, the ranks of Spanish 
privateers could be reinforced by private persons, subjects of the Kings 
of France or Britain, or of the Emperor.115 
108 Reported by de la Leurie, 5 August 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fols 207v–08r. 
The presence of corruption in political affairs was not exceptional in the early modern 
period, where private and public interest were often insufficiently distinguished, see: 
Aaron Graham, Corruption, Party, and Government in Britain, 1702–1713 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015); Peter R. Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime 
France, 1720–1745 (London: Routledge, 1996); Niels Grüne and Simona Slanička, 
eds, Korruption: Historische Annäherungen an eine Grundfigur politischer Kommunikation 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010). However, practices in Naples seemed 
to have come across as particularly striking.
109 Aubert, Genoa, 27 June 1719, o.c., fol. 156v. 
110 Aubert, Genoa, 13 June 1719, AN, Marine, B1, fol. 147v. 
111 Philip Woodfine, Britannia’s Glories: The Walpole Ministry and the 1739 War 
with Spain (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1998); Victoria Stapells Johnson, 
Corsairs of Santo Domingo: A Socio-Economic Study, 1718–1779 (unpublished master 
thesis, University of Ottawa, 1985). 
112 E.g. French vessel seized off the coast of Malaga, 14 March 1719 (report by 
Fleury de Vareilles: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 92v). 
113 Report by le Bailly Lorenz, Florence, 3 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 83r. 
114 Vayrac, III, pp. 312–18.
115 E.g. the case of Le Brun, armator from Toulon, who took a French Pink out 
of the port of Livorno (Clairambault, Livorno, 31 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 
40, fol. 104r). Le Brun was broke and had only himself to hold accountable for his 
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These search operations were evidently hotly disputed, as were those 
of the British concerning the transport of Spanish contraband on French 
vessels in the War of the Quadruple Alliance.116 The Anglo-French Treaty 
on Trade and Commerce concluded in Utrecht (but never ratified for the 
core articles)117 contained an article limiting mutual searches to those 
carried out in pursuit of strict contraband.118 The British fleet, however, 
did not respect this when patrolling the Mediterranean. The British 
consul in Livorno even declared the Treaty of Commerce ‘ridiculous’.119 
No ‘free ships, free goods’ principle was applicable to French vessels.120 
Even carriages of salted meat, ‘goods declared free under the Treaty of 
Utrecht’,121 destined for Malta were stopped and seized, under suspicion 
of being destined for Spanish-occupied Sicily.122 In one specific case, the 
English captain and consul in Livorno blackmailed the French owner, 
asking for 200 pistoles before he would release the vessel. The crew were 
molested, kicked, and assaulted with lashes and swords.
Some practical influence on local case law could be useful, as stated 
by the Council of Commerce in the case of Naples: 
[…] no expenditure is more useful for the navigation of His Majesty’s subjects than 
the annual gratification of 150 piastres paid to the judge responsible for adjudicating 
the seizures of the French nation, who always ranks among the most prominent 
ministers of the Country [Naples] […] with the necessary credit and authority 
to protect and give justice to the French and maintain them in their privileges.123
crimes (Clairambault, 12 May 1719, o.c., fol. 137r). Yet, he managed to escape with 
‘une femme de mauvaise vie’ (Clairambault, 9 June 1719, o.c., fol. 149v).
116 Memorandum of the Council of Commerce, 31 January 1719, o.c. 
117 Alimento, pp. 107–28 (p. 120); Doowhan Ahn, ‘The Anglo-French Treaty 
of Commerce of 1713: Tory Trade Politicsm and the Question of Dutch Decline’, 
History of European Ideas, 36 (2012), 167–80.
118 Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Louis XIV and Queen Anne, 
Utrecht, 11 April 1713, CUD VIII/1, no. CLII, Art. XIX. 
119 Clairambault, Livorno, 16 June 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 154r. 
120 Alimento, pp. 107–28 (p. 109). 
121 Clairambault, Livorno, 21 July 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 180v. 
122 Clairambault, Livorno: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 135r: ‘[…] even if this would 
have been the case, trade in it would have been allowed under the Treaty of Utrecht, 
proscribing stopping vessels with no contraband aboard.’ 
123 AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 39r. 
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THE DRAFT TREATY124
In May 1719, the Council of the Marine drafted a convention aimed at 
the Republics of Genoa and Venice and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.125 
The inspiration came from an earlier proposal directed at the neutral 
Dutch Republic, drafted in November 1718, three months after the battle 
of Cape Passaro.126 Materially, the clauses pertained to domestic law. The 
treaty proposal amounted to a French imposition of legislation on the 
small neutral Italian states, but was of prime importance to safeguard 
Mediterranean trade.127 Its first article established free entrance to ports 
for any vessel, either warships or merchants, including those belonging 
to privateers, armed for war with commissions from their sovereign. 
However, the second article forbade the arming of vessels for war. Those 
who contravened these requirements had to be prevented from sailing 
by having their ships confiscated. Article three ordered all seizures 
by privateers to leave the relevant port within twenty-four hours and 
forbade their sale. A longer stay entailed the loss of the ship in question, 
the release of its crew, and the impossibility of the privateer’s enforcing 
any further claim. This operation was similar to what had been agreed 
previously, during the War of the Spanish Succession, with the King of 
Denmark (who was neutral at the start of the war).128 The twenty-four 
124 Convention project between Britain, France, Austria, the Grand Duchy of 
Tuscany and the Republics of Venice and Genoa, to maintain neutrality in the ports 
of their dominance and to avoid piracy, Paris, s.d., NA, SP, 78, 164, fols 82r–84v. 
Williams, pp. 329–30.
125 Schnakenbourg, p. 23.
126 Stair to Craggs, Paris, 8 November 1718: NA, SP, 78, 162, fol. 293v; Frederik 
Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy: Franco-British Diplomacy after the 
Peace of Utrecht (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 164.
127 Richard Whatmore, ‘‘Neither Masters nor Slaves’: Small States and Empire in 
the Long Eighteenth Century’, in Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British 
Imperial Thought, ed. by Duncan Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
pp. 53–81.
128 Schnakenbourg, p. 71. Art. 3, Treaty of Alliance between Denmark, Britain 
and the States-General, Odense, 20 January 1701, CUD VIII/1, no. I, 1. French 
diplomats tried to have the presence of French privateers accepted for Denmark and 
Norway. Frederick IV of Denmark allowed the sale of captures in his ports from 1711 
on, in return for reciprocal permission for Danish subjects in Britain, the Republic 
and France.
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hour rule can be traced back to Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Marine Ordinance 
of 1681, forbidding privateers to stay longer in French ports, save when 
the seizure concerned an enemy ship.129
The problems encountered by French merchants were characterised as 
the exercise of ‘criminal activities and piracy’ by ‘private persons, subject 
either to the allied Powers or the King of Spain’, in order to enrich 
themselves in an unjust way, ‘with avaricious intentions’, without ‘the 
permission to privateer on the basis of legitimate commissions issued 
by their sovereigns’ (art. V.). Captains entering the ports of Genoa, 
Venice or the Grand Duchy of Tuscany would have had to submit 
themselves to compulsory verification by the local magistrates, as well 
as the consuls of the ‘respective powers having an interest in the case’. 
In view of the incessant trouble described above, the text also aimed 
at the privateers as well as at the distribution of power between local 
jurisdictions and foreign consuls. 
The Italian neutrals were equipped with their own jurisdictions, able 
to exercise judicial control over seizures.130 Their neutrality implied equal 
treatment for all belligerents. However, this concept was hard to sustain 
in view of the imbalance of power between the coalition and the King 
of Spain.131 Aubert, consul in Genoa, wrote an extensive memorandum 
on consular jurisdiction. He stated that Genoese maritime magistrates 
infringed upon French consular jurisdiction (governed by Colbert’s 1681 
ordinance), insofar as vessels or individuals from the French nation were 
concerned. Consular decisions were only enforceable after a Genoese 
notary declared them conformable to the laws and statutes of the Genoese 
Republic. That said, Aubert complained of excessive encroachments by 
the local judges, who treated cases on their merits. Another example is 
129 Schnakenbourg, p. 7. See: Ordonnance de la Marine du mois d’Aoust 1681: 
Commentée & Conférée sur les anciennes Ordonnances, le Droit Romain, & les nouveaux 
Réglemens (Paris: Osmont, 1714), p. 336.
130 Request of 18 December 1718 by captain Gerfroid, merchant from St Tropez, 
to obtain the effective restitution of his effects seized by Venetian privateers in 1717. 
AN, Marine, B1, 36, fol. 17r. 
131 E.g. de Silva, Livorno, 30 December 1718: AN, Marine, B1, fol. 21r. The 
Spanish consul had bought a vessel and raised the royal flag, loaded it with ammunition 
and sent it to the army in Sicily. As a reaction, the French consul Clairambault ordered 
French ships lying in the harbour to disembark after protestation of the Imperial consul.
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the decision of the Venetian Senate to systematically visit any foreign 
vessel, contrary to established Imperial and French privileges. Naturally, 
Charles VI’s, Louis XV’s and George I’s consuls objected.132 Venice had 
to grant an exception to the Emperor, confirming his subjects’ rights, 
and also allow French and British vessels to come and go without an 
official visit of inspection.133
Reports by French consuls on the peninsula alerted the Regent to 
the necessity of imposing clearer rules, even if this meant intrusion 
into domestic legislation. French consuls had jurisdiction over their 
own nationals, a privilege which they jealously guarded. For instance, 
the Regent issued an ordinance forbidding the Sossins merchant family 
to execute a local judicial decision obtained from municipal judges in 
Livorno against a certain Chavignon, another French merchant from 
Marseille.134 Disputes between French merchants, or any disputes 
whereby a French merchant acted as the defendant or debtor in a trial, 
were under the French consul’s exclusive jurisdiction. Even several years 
of residence abroad could not change this reality. Appeals could only 
be heard before the (French) sovereign court of parliament closest to 
the foreign port, namely that of Provence:
On the basis of the law of nations, His Majesty has never conceived of nor tolerated 
any situation whereby disputes between his subjects would be dependent on other 
judges than those who give justice in his name, and under his authority.135
Beyond these parameters, merchants could only observe what tran-
spired in proceedings before the domestic judges with responsibility 
for adjudicating seizures by Italian privateers: Aubert, consul in Genoa, 
had no choice but to respect a decision on a seized French vessel and to 
ignore the advice of the British consul to seize vessels armed in France 
and confiscated by Italian privateers.136 Attempts to reserve jurisdiction 
132 Le Blond, Venice, 5 August 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fols 191r–91v. 
133 Le Blond, Venice, 12 August 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fols 200v–01r. 
134 AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 62v. 
135 Ibid., fol. 64r.
136 Answer by the Regent to consul Aubert in Genoa, 31 January 1719: AN, 
Marine, B1, 40, fol. 46r. 
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over cases involving seized French vessels were unsuccessful.137 Moreover, 
Italian judges tended to uphold and maintain the neutral status of their 
port. This implied that they would refuse to arrest French, English or 
Imperial subjects participating in privateering for the King of Spain.138 
As a result, treacherous or deserting subjects found a genuine safe haven 
to sell off the benefits of their depredations. Commerce with the enemy 
could thus continue under the Spanish flag.139 Spanish privateering 
vessels could in fact have been fitted out and armed in Marseille, raised 
the Spanish flag on the high seas, been staffed with French sailors, seized 
an English vessel and safely sailed to Genoa, where their prize could be 
sold with the help of French auctioneers.140 Or, on the other hand, the 
authorities of the Italian ports could insist on enforcing their neutral 
status, by threatening to visit and search all foreign vessels which docked 
in their harbours.141
A final clause of the draft treaty established sanctions in case a pri-
vateer should transpire to be acting on a false commission, under 
double commission (granted by two sovereigns), or, indeed, without 
any authorisation whatsoever.142 Vessel and merchandise alike were 
to be confiscated, to the advantage of the neutral state, which would 
punish captain, officers and crew as forbans and gens courans les mers sans 
aveu.143 However, these regulations did not come into force. Charles VI 
137 E.g. de la Leurie, Naples, 14 August 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fols 208r–09v. 
138 Report by Aubert to the French Regent: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 46r. 
139 E.g. Saint-Frémond, Venice, 20 May 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 135v–36r: 
a Spanish vessel sent from Sicily to the Spanish envoy in Venice was on the brink 
of returning, when the French consul ordered its conservatory seizure before a local 
court. The carriage would serve as an ‘hypotheque’ for the outstanding debts of its 
armator. With all material destined for Sicily locked inside the ship, the Spanish 
would never receive it. 
140 Report by D’Auvergne, Genoa, 14 March 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 91v. 
Report by the widow David (Genoa), 4 March 1719: ibid., fol. 92r. 
141 E.g. Report by St Frémond, Venice, 1 April 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 109v. 
Combined Austrian, English and French pressure made this however very unlikely. 
142 ‘[…] no legal warfare, but disguised crime […]’, see: Bynkershoek, p. 107.
143 See: Joaquin Alcaide Fernandez, ‘Hostes Humani Generis: Pirates, Slavers, 
and Other Criminals’, in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, 
ed. by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
pp. 120–44 (pp. 120–22).
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refused to adhere to the terms of this convention.144 As explained 
above, corsairs from Naples were among the most persistent threats to 
French commerce. If one of the three pillars of the alliance – namely 
the Emperor – would not take part, it was useless to attempt to impose 
the articles on Italian neutrals. 
EPILOGUE: THE ULTIMATE RECOURSE  
TO NATURAL LAW
As French and British merchants alike voiced their anger at the commer-
cial damage they had to suffer, the fundamental nature of free navigation 
between nations was at the heart of their argument.145 Falling back on 
the general law of nations as an avenue of complaint was not unique. 
During the conflict, France and Britain were frustrated with Dutch 
aloofness from the struggle for what they defined as being the common 
good of Europe. Hispano-Dutch trade continued unhampered during 
the War of the Quadruple Alliance, whereas France and Britain lost 
part of their market. In line with general Dutch attitudes to neutrality, 
the States-General preferred to be medius in bello, or non hostes.146 This 
meant that they preferred to gain in financial terms from the principles 
of free trade, rather than prioritising ruinous spending on their defence, 
as had been the case in the War of the Spanish Succession.147 This search 
for what one might describe as a temporary commercial advantage 
effectively removed the Dutch Republic from the ‘top table’ of European 
144 Maricon to Courtes, Genoa, 11 July 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 161r. 
145 Chammorel, London, 28 September 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 237v; 
ibid., 30 November 1719: AN, Marine, B1, 40, fol. 300r. 
146 Bynkershoek, p. 60; Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Dutch Decline as a European 
Phenomenon’, History of European Ideas, 36 (2010), 139–52; Schnakenbourg, Entre 
la Guerre et la Paix; Jean-François Chanet and Christian Windler, Les Ressources des 
Faibles: Neutralités, Sauvegardes, Accommodements en Temps de Guerre (XVIe–XVIIIe 
Siècle) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009); Jean Matthieu Mattei, Histoire 
du droit de la guerre, 1700–1819: Introduction à l’histoire du droit international: Avec 
une biographie des principaux auteurs de la doctrine internationaliste de l’antiquité à nos 
jours (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2006), pp. 591–93.
147 Johan Aalbers, ‘Holland’s Financial Problems (1713–1733) and the Wars against 
Louis XIV’, in Britain and the Netherlands, ed. by A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 79–123.
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negotiations during the conflict. Moreover, the freedom of commerce 
claimed by the Dutch in the War of the Quadruple Alliance contrasted 
with their own attitude three years later. In 1722, Emperor Charles VI 
granted an official patent to the Imperial East Indies Company in 
Ostend, one of the most important ports in the Austrian Netherlands. 
However, Britain and the Dutch Republic jointly moved to curb the 
potential success of their commercial competitor. The formal legal basis 
for the Company’s elimination was the violation of the Treaty of Munster, 
at the occasion of which Philip IV of Spain had denied access to the 
parts of the Indies controlled by the Dutch to his ‘Castilian’ subjects. 
The treaty of Munster’s validity was connected to inherent limitations 
on the principle of free navigation on the high seas, as Hugo Grotius 
had expounded in his famous Mare Liberum.148 Most of the literature 
follows the Dutch thesis, supported by such influential names as Jean 
Barbeyrac, professor of public law in Groningen. Unfortunately, various 
pamphlets written against this commercial restrictiveness have been 
forgotten.149 However, one of these writings, attributed to the Imperial 
historiographer Jean du Mont de Carels-Kroon,150 who drafted the 
commercial treaty allowing the Ostend Company to trade directly in 
Spain, fundamentally undermined the Dutch point of view.151 What if 
the new King of Spain, Philip V, were to open his overseas dominions 
148 Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Trade, Chartered Companies, and Mercantile Associations’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, pp. 338–58; Robert 
Feenstra, ‘Mare Liberum – Contexte Historique et Concepts Fondamentaux’, in 
Grotius et l’Ordre Juridique International: Travaux du Colloque Hugo Grotius Genève, 
10–11 Novembre 1983, ed. by Alfred Dufour, Peter Haggenmacher and Jiri Toman 
(Lausanne: Payot, 1985), pp. 37–42.
149 Michel Huisman, La Belgique Commerciale sous l’Empereur Charles VI: La 
Compagnie d’Ostende: Étude Historique de Politique Commerciale et Coloniale (Brussels: 
Lamertin, 1902). 
150 Stephan Verosta, ‘Droit International et Droit Interne chez Jean Dumont 
(1666–1727)’, in Mélanges Offerts à Henri Rolin (Paris: Pedone, 1964), pp. 479–87.
151 Jean du Mont de Carels-Kroon, La vérité du fait, du droit, et de l’intérêt de 
tout ce qui concerne le commerce des Indes, etabli aux Païs Bas Autrichiens par octroi 
de sa Majesté Impér. et Catholique ([n.p.]: [n. pub.], 1726). See more elaborately: 
Frederik Dhondt, ‘Delenda est haec Carthago: The Ostend Company as a Problem 
of European Great Power Politics (1722–1727)’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire/
Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis, 93 (2015), 397–437.
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to Charles VI’s subjects? Would not this new treaty lift the limitation 
installed in 1648 by his predecessor Philip IV? Just as in the case of 
Mediterranean trade, the inherent logic of geopolitical realities settled 
the affair. However, the flexibility of universal discourse on free trade as 
a natural right between sovereigns could not be eradicated. The Dutch 
Republic shifted from a militant position in the early seventeenth 
century, against the Hispano-Portuguese division of the world into 
two hemispheres at the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 and also against 
the British opinion of Mare Clausum, propagated by John Selden,152 to 
one of self-serving repression, and consolidation of its own position.153 
Even if the Dutch abandoned this point of view in order to eliminate 
a  competitor, the validity of Grotius’ initial affirmation remained. 
The Dutch scholar had referred to the freedom to trade and navigate, 
as enlarged upon in Justinian’s Digest. In view of the lack of broader 
ratification of the Franco-British trade treaty, this would remain the 
bedrock of merchants’ legal defence, at any time when their vessels had 
been ‘arrested against the law of nations and contrary to the treaties 
concluded between France and England’.154
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